Vice President J.D. Vance has generated a wave of noise around economics in recent weeks. He advocates for Hamilton’s nationalist economics over libertarian champion Milton Friedman’s, and raises economic policies that were unthinkable on the right a decade or two ago. The rise of an alternative or “New Right” economic philosophy still confounds many DC elites, let alone those who can’t lounge around perusing the latest X thread or pontificating about the dismal science.
We know this economic battle kicked off as Trump came down the escalator, railing about the economic carnage of mass immigration, free trade, and unshared defense burdens. But what is this new paradigm rising — or reviving — among conservatives?
The school has been referred to both admiringly and critically as New Right economics, conservative economics, American school economics, economic nationalism, common good capitalism, stakeholder capitalism, and even quasi–socialism. Whichever your preferred term and whether or not you admire this emerging economic strand, it is not going anywhere soon.
To understand this paradigm, let’s start with what preceded it. The latest dominant theory on the right emerged as a foil to international communism and in response to the stagflation crisis of the 1970s, in which inflation and unemployment rose at the same time. Keynesianism, the incumbent paradigm, considered this phenomenon impossible and was blamed for the crisis, leading to supply-side or neoliberal economics around the Reagan era. The paradigm prominently featured people like Friedman and “Chicago School” economics, among others.
That school’s core premises were that free markets most efficiently allocate resources, rarely fail, and spontaneously order and correct themselves; individuals are rational and best off making their own decisions; and state intervention is usually counterproductive and must be very limited. This reflected both praise for market efficiency and deep-seated skepticism toward policy’s competence. These ideas led to policies favoring tax cuts for businesses and high earners, deregulation, trade and capital liberalization, privatization, reduced social spending, higher immigration, and more flexible labor markets.
Neoliberalism prevailed with minor adjustments until about 2016, when Trump won the Republican nomination. His election was more a gradual departure from neoliberal economics than a radical transformation because Trump still pursued many neoliberal priorities in his first term. Concerns over China’s rise, stagnant wages, blue-collar job losses, disillusionment with globalization, and deindustrialization helped break the old consensus.
New Right economics has gradually taken shape since then. It shares several key principles with neoliberalism, like regard for private property and markets. In many respects, the debate is less about ends and more a disagreement over means. The New Right’s central departure may be rejecting the idea that the sum of all individual choices tends to automatically add up to optimal outcomes. In other words, market outcomes do not necessarily equal American national interests. Policy may need to more deeply constrain, guide, and supplement markets toward goals like family and community stability, dignified work, and industrial strength.
This reflects a deeper philosophical divide. Classical liberals and libertarians tend to believe individuals should be able to make (nearly) any decision about “the good life” for themselves. Conservatives, while recognizing the importance of pluralism, emphasize the need for healthy institutions and some shared understanding of what is good for people. They are also more inclined to view what Classical Liberals see as “natural” or “automatic” in society and markets as in fact culturally and historically contingent.
One core body the New Right seeks to defend is the nation-state itself. While most on the right already permit market exceptions for defense, the New Right contends that markets can undermine the nation in other ways too. During COVID-19, for instance, American reliance on China for essential medical supplies revealed dangerous vulnerabilities. The New Right argues that we must not outsource essentials like medical supplies, energy, critical infrastructure, agriculture, and defense to unreliable powers. It also asserts that national borders are more than cultural norms or defense thresholds. They enclose an economic and political zone that should put upward pressure on wages and force companies to invest in American workers and innovation, rather than race to the bottom by offshoring or hiring foreign workers.
These conservatives increasingly believe that market valuation may fail to reflect important aspects of value. For example, unconstrained financial engineering may boost shareholder value but weaken long-term investment. Some Wall Street firms make millions using ultra-fast networks to trade stocks milliseconds before updated prices travel between financial exchanges. It is hard to see how that helps working families in real America. The New Right contends that making real things matters for defense, innovation, quality jobs, and supply chain resilience even if that is not strictly reflected in consumer prices. The state thus has a role in constraining markets to nurture productive capacity. In other words, computer chips are more important than potato chips.
In addition to nation and industry, the New Right sees a state role in strengthening families, communities, and the preconditions for healthy markets and society.
Take the two-income trap: Markets reward dual earners, but the resulting pressure on parents to work more often reduces valuable time raising their children, despite parents’ preferences. Policy could support families through paid leave, social insurance for those with kids, or wage improvement. Similarly, tech and entertainment companies monetize our attention at the cost of social capital and mental health, justifying regulation. Other parts of the “vice economy,” like online gambling, are suspect too.
New Right economists also reconsider the role of organized labor. While skeptical of corrupt unions, they see organized labor as an intermediary institution that can support economic and community health.
To the New Right, these institutions and social goods form a sort of scaffolding or framework in which markets operate. Whereas neoliberals see a clear line between government enforcing basic rules on the one hand and intervening in the game on the other, the New Right contests this clear distinction. It insists that the state always, explicitly or by omission, shapes the game’s arena. Neutral arenas and rules do not exist. New Right intellectuals are still hashing out their policy playbook, but their playbook goes beyond merely shrinking government.
But often the playbook isn’t all that new. “New” Right leaders like Vance, Secretary Rubio, Senator Josh Hawley, American Affairs, and American Compass regularly harken back to ideas and policies from Hamilton, Henry Clay, Abraham Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, and even Reagan himself. Some point to Reagan’s famous words, “the nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from the Government, and I’m here to help.” The New Right points to what he says three sentences later:
But until we make that transition, the Government must act compassionately and responsibly. In order to see farmers through these tough times, our administration has committed record amounts of assistance, spending more in this year alone than any previous administration spent during its entire tenure. No area of the budget, including defense, has grown as fast as our support for agriculture.
Despite decades of being downplayed, the idea that government should bend markets — which are a powerful tool — toward desirable national, industrial, and community goals has reemerged on the right with strength. From global competition and stagnating productivity to society-wide social capital deficits and worker disenfranchisement, New Right economics will continue offering compelling answers to contemporary challenges.
